
Wu, Wen-Cheng *

I. The Principles and Criteria of Concept Formation and Classification
II. Democracy and Majoritarian Democracy v.s. Consensus Democracy
III. Totalitarianism v.s. Authoritarianism
IV. Bureaucratic Authoritarianism
V. Electoral (Competitive) Authoritarian Regime
VI. Conclusion

Classification is the beginning of understanding. It is the main method of sorting things out and making sense out of the world we live in. When we classify political phenomena (activities, systems, or institutions) into classes and give each class a general noun we form classificatory concepts. This paper tries to use the basic principles and criteria of

* Professor, Department of Political Science, Soochow University, Taipei, Taiwan.
E-mail: wjuel@ms33.hinet.net
投稿日期：2015 年 5 月 11 日；接受刊登日期：2015 年 12 月 23 日。
東吳政治學報/2015/第三十三卷第四期/頁 211-281。
classification to critically review the important classificatory concepts of modern political regimes in comparative politics. Modern political regimes can be classified into three main types: democratic, totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. To meet the criterion of exclusiveness, totalitarian regimes and authoritarian regimes, especially one-party authoritarian regimes must be clearly distinguished from each other. Lijphart’s classification of democracy into majoritarian versus consensus democracies sheds light on different political effects of these two modes of democracy, but his classification does not meet the criteria of classification. Authoritarian regimes can be further classified into two types: military authoritarian regimes and one-party authoritarian regimes. O’Donnell’s concept of bureaucratic authoritarianism focuses on the role of bureaucracies and the economic determinants of these regimes. But most of these regimes are established and ruled by the military, it may be more appropriate to just call them military authoritarian regimes. Electoral (or competitive) authoritarian regimes may have quite a few empirical cases, but it is a self contradictory term. It blurs the boundary between democracy and authoritarianism. If some democratic trappings are there just to consolidate authoritarian rule and do not meet the minimal criteria of democracy, it may be better just call them authoritarian regimes.

**Keywords:** classificatory concept, political regime, democratic regime, totalitarian regime, authoritarian regime
I. The Principles and Criteria of Concept Formation and Classification

To call the study of politics ‘political science’, political scientists assume that politics can be studied with scientific principles and methods. The scientific process of theory construction begins with the formation of concepts (Isaak, 1985: 71). Concepts are the building blocks of scientific political study. If a relationship between two concepts can be found, then a generalization can be formulated. A generalization is just a hypothesized relationship between two concepts or two phenomena. Of the two concepts in a generalization, one is called “explanandum,” the concept (or phenomenon) to be explained; another is called “explanans,” the concept (or phenomenon) that explains. Thus, if a generalization is formulated then a political phenomenon is explained and the main concern and primary job of a political scientist is accomplished (Isaak, 1985: 134-136).

Simply speaking, a concept is just a general noun that a political scientist gives to a political phenomenon. A phenomenon that interests a political scientist is usually an important and recurrent one. A phenomenon is the common characteristics that manifest and can be observed in some similar political events that occur in different places and at different times. The noun that historians give to a political event is a particular noun. A concept must be a general noun because it
usually refers to a recurrent phenomenon, not a particular event. A particular noun needs no definition, but, as general nouns, concepts do need to be defined. The simplest way to define a concept is to write down the important common characteristics of those similar political events because that is what a phenomenon is. Thus, a concept must be defined empirically, i.e., with observable characteristics.

Concepts in political science are general nouns. They all have the level of generality. At the first stage of theory construction-concept formation, political scientists encounter the first dilemma of political science that is to determine the level of generality of a concept and the range or scope of the phenomenon they want to describe and explain. The formation of a concept has two steps: first, give the phenomenon a noun, and then second, define it. Both steps have to do with determining the level of generality. A more or a less general noun can be chosen and given to a phenomenon, e.g. political development is more general than democratic transition. The democratic transition in Taiwan is easier to describe and explain. Political development in Taiwan is too general. That includes all political phenomena that have ever occurred in Taiwan. We can not explain all political phenomena in Taiwan, it would be impossible. We can only explain one phenomenon at a time.

After forming a concept, we encounter the dilemma again when we define it. There are two kinds of definitions: broad definition and narrow definition. The broader the definition the more general the concept becomes and the narrower the definition and the less general
the concept becomes. For example, if we define ‘revolution’ as major and drastic changes in politics, that is a very broad definition. With such a definition, lifting of martial law in 1987, the first direct election of the president in 1996, and the first rotation of power in 2000 can all be described as revolutionary events. If we define revolution as mass participation in an uprising, involving large-scale political violence, an old or traditional regime is toppled and a new or modern regime with new political systems is established, that is a narrower definition. With such a definition, the above mentioned events can be excluded from the phenomenon we call the revolution. The higher level of generality of the concept and the broader of its definition the wider the range and scope the concept and phenomenon covers, yet, it will be more difficult to refer to tangible and observable things in the empirical world. However, we can not lower the generality of the concept and define it so narrowly as to become a particular noun, then it is no longer a concept.

After World War II the geographical scope of political science has been greatly expanded to include developing as well as developed areas. Political scientists find many concepts formed before the War to describe phenomena in the Western World are not applicable to the developing areas in the Third World. There are mainly two solutions: one is broadening the meaning (definition) of existing concepts to cover developing areas and the other is forming new concepts with the high generality that are applicable to the whole world. The wider the world we want to cover, the more we need concepts that are able to
travel and the more we have to resort to conceptual stretching, i.e., to

general yet vague conceptualization. The result of concept stretching is

that our gains in extensional coverage tend to be matched by losses in

connotative precision. It appears that we can cover more only by

saying less, and by saying less in a far less precise manner. As we

climb or descend along the ladder (level) of abstraction (generality) we

obtain different degrees of inclusiveness (scope) and, conversely,
specificity. Perhaps the medium level of abstraction is the best choice

because generalizations are usually formulated with concepts at this

level (Sartori, 1970: 1034-1041).

All sound and useful concepts in political science must have two

imports: empirical import and systematic import (Hempel, 1952:

39-45). Empirical import means that concepts must be linked with the

world of observation, the empirical world. The concept must be

defined with observable, tangible, and/or measurable things in the

empirical world. This kind of definition is called an empirical

definition. As mentioned above, the more general the concept is the

more difficult it is be empirically defined. Systematic import has to do

with the relationships between concepts. To be useful, a concept

cannot be formed in isolation. It is of little use if a concept has no

relationship with any other concept. When a concept is hypothesized to

have a certain relationship with another concept, the concept has

systematic import and we formulate a generalization. With a

generalization, we have an explanation and without a generalization

there is no explanation. That is why we say a concept is of little use if
it has no systematic import (Issak, 1985: 89-90). A generalization is just a hypothesis, it needs to be verified. In fact, most academic researches done by political scientists are to verify existing generalizations and theories. To be verifiable both two concepts in the generalization must have an empirical import that is they must be empirically defined. Only with an empirical import can we be sure that the two cases we choose to verify the generalization is one occurrence of the phenomenon that explains and one occurrence of the phenomenon that is explained.

Concepts are formed to designate (give general nouns to) and describe (identify and define with observable characteristics of) political phenomena. Concepts in political science have many functions. In addition to designation and description, concepts can be used to classify, compare and measure. There are several kinds of concepts with different functions and usefulness. More specifically, there are classificatory, comparative, and quantitative concepts, and the most important concept among these three is the classificatory concept. Many, perhaps most, concepts in political science are classificatory concepts. Classification is the beginning of understanding. We do not know the nature of many things and phenomena occurring around us. But if we can classify them into different classes we begin to understand a little about them. Classification is the main method for sorting out things and making sense out of this world we live in. When we classify political phenomena into classes and give each class a general noun we form
Classificatory concepts are also concepts. To be useful a classificatory concept must also have empirical import and systematic import. In addition to empirical import and systematic import, a good classification must also meet two more specific criteria: exhaustiveness and exclusiveness (Isaak, 1985: 84; Sartori, 1970: 1038). Exhaustiveness (or inclusiveness) means when we classify things every every case can be put into one class. There are no leftovers, nothing (or no case) is excluded from the classification. Exclusiveness means when we classify things one thing or one case can only be put into one class, nothing (or no case) can be put into two or more classes. Exclusiveness also means that each class must be very different from other classes. Actually, the basic principle of classification is that we should put similar things in one class and different things in different classes. Simply speaking, the two criteria of classification mean that every case shall fall into one class and one class only. A good classification helps us to understand. However, a bad classification or classificatory concept only confuses.

Classificatory concepts are not (or different from) comparative concepts and quantitative concepts. Classificatory concepts are either-or types of concepts, not more-or-less types of concepts. Different classes are different in kind, not different in degree. “What is” qualitative questions cannot be changed into “how much” quantitative questions. An object (or a case) can not be put into two classes, not even a mixed or hybrid of two classes. It violates the
principle of exclusiveness. Classificatory concepts are required to be mutually exclusive. Of course, we can attach numerical values (or an index) to a concept. But the prior question is “how much” in “what”. Concept formation must come before quantification (Sartori, 1970: 1036-1037).

There are two kinds of classification: dichotomous classification and multiple classifications. Political scientists can form a concept of democracy and then classify all political regimes as either democratic or undemocratic. We can define the concept, democracy, with observable characteristics; such as popular elections of public officials and fair competition between political parties. Then we can place all regimes that have these characteristics in the category of the democratic regime, and all those regimes that do not have these characteristics in the category of the undemocratic regime. The dichotomous classification has only two classes while multiple classification has more than two classes. Aristotle classified ancient city states in Greece into three main types: monarchy (rule by one man), oligarchy (rule by a few men) and democracy (rule by many people), and then each of the three types were further divided into two types: good (rule for public interest) and bad (rule for personal interest), altogether six types. This is a good example of multiple classification. Sometimes a political scientist finds a classification is not inclusive, some items are left out or unclassified. If those items have similar characteristics, a new classificatory concept can be formed; if they do not have enough similar characteristics, a
miscellaneous category can be created. Either way, the classification is a weak one and is not very useful.

The above-mentioned points are the important principles and criteria of classification and formation of classificatory concepts. This paper tries to review the important classificatory concepts of modern political regimes in comparative politics, using the above mentioned basic principles and criteria of concept formation and classification. Political science is full of many classificatory concepts of political regime. This paper will review the three major types of modern political regimes, namely democracy, totalitarianism, and authoritarianism. This paper will also critically review the two subtypes of democratic regime-majoritarian and consensus democracies and two subtypes of authoritarian regimes-bureaucratic authoritarian and electoral (or competitive) authoritarian regimes because these subtypes have gained wide currency and usage among many political scientists. Although this article is only a theoretical review article, not an empirical research paper, clarifying these classificatory concepts can pave/create a sounder theoretical foundation for future empirical research.

II. Democracy and Majoritarian Democracy v.s. Consensus Democracy

By and large political science is still at the beginning stage of understanding. The nature of politics is difficult to understand and the
reason why political phenomena occur is very difficult to explain so all scholars can do is to classify phenomena into classes (types or categories), the formation of classificatory concepts. If we can classify a phenomenon into different types, it seems that we begin to understand the phenomenon a little bit. Some phenomena are easy to classify, e.g. the form of state can be classified into two types: monarchy and republic. A monarchy is a kingdom or an empire. The head of state, the king or the emperor, is hereditary and usually sits on the throne for life. In a republic, the head of state, usually called the president, is elected and serves with limited terms and tenure. This is a straightforward classification with little confusion. A monarchy is not necessarily an undemocratic regime. Monarchy system can be further divided into two types: absolute monarchy and constitutional monarchy. An absolute monarchy, where an emperor or a king rules with absolute or real political power, is a traditional and undemocratic regime. A constitutional monarchy, where the emperor or king becomes the figure head of state with only ceremonial duties but no real political power, can still establish a constitutional democracy. Likewise, a republic is not necessarily a democratic regime. A totalitarian or an authoritarian regime can also be established in a republic.

On the other hand, political regime: the method of government, how the nation is governed, or how the government exercises its power and the relationship of people to their government, is more difficult to classify. Aristotle’s classification is for the city states in Greece in
Political scientists, especially in the field of comparative politics, nowadays classify modern political regimes into three main types: totalitarian, authoritarian, and democratic regimes. These three classificatory concepts were formed by different scholars. The classification is not done by one scholar, but a consensus among most political scientists. Juan Linz is perhaps the first scholar who put the three types together as the three main types of modern political regimes (Linz, 1975). Since it is not classified by one scholar with the same classificatory criteria, the best thing we can do is to discuss these three classificatory concepts one by one.

Although democracy is a modern type of political regime, it was first established by the United States of America in 1787, the concept was first formed by Aristotle a long time ago. Athens, a city-state in ancient Greece, briefly practiced a democratic form of government by holding public meetings attended by all citizens in the city to decide public affairs, an ancient form of direct democracy. In the past, many scholars have given many different definitions to democracy. “Classical democratic theories” put forth by various scholars and thinkers before the end of the 19th century are mainly normative theories. Mass participation by all citizens in decision-making or policy-making on all public affairs is feasible only in a small town meeting, village or neighborhood community meeting, but is unrealistic and infeasible in a large country. In a large country, especially a complex industrialized society, a small group of public
officials must be elected to participate in policy-making. Democracy is necessarily a representative democracy.

Most scholars of “classical democratic theories” gave democracy normative definitions, according to what ideal situation they thought democracy or politics should be, Joseph Schumpeter summarized the eighteenth century philosophy of democracy into a final definition: “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will.” (Schumpeter, 1943: 250). Although this definition corresponds with representative democracy and is partly empirical because in the 18th century parliaments and congress had been established in America and several West European countries, but it still is a normative and unrealistic definition. Schumpeter was right to point out that there is no such thing as the common good and general will of the people that all people could agree on and the fact that to different individuals and groups the common good and the general will are bound to mean different things (Schumpeter, 1943: 250-268).

Classical theories of democracy were normative and value-laden, whereas modern political theories are empirical and value-free, grounded firmly in the facts of political life. Schumpeter, arguably the first scholar of “modern theories of democracy” considered that the facts showed that classical democratic theories were in need of revision so [that] he put forward a new definition of democracy. He
argued that democracy is not an ideal situation and offered the following as an empirical and realistic definition of democracy: “That institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.” (Schumpeter, 1943: 269).

Schumpeter considered the central participatory and decision-making role of the people in the “classical democratic theories” rested on an empirically unrealistic foundation. In Schumpeter’s theory, participation by the people has no special or central role in the democratic method. It is the competition for leadership—the power to decide or the right to rule—that is the distinctive feature of democracy. He did not even regard universal suffrage necessary (Schumpeter, 1943: 244-245). All that is required is that enough citizens turn out to vote to keep the electoral machinery—the institutional arrangement—working. The focus of his theory is on the minority of leaders. It is the competition between leaders for votes that is the major characteristics in his democratic method (Schumpeter, 1943: 272-283).

Robert Dahl, another famous scholar of “modern democratic theories”, pointed out that democracy is made up of at least two dimensions: in addition to competition (he called it “public contestation”); there is another dimension: participation (he called it “the right to participate”). In Dahl’s view, democracy is a political method, a list of institutional arrangements that center on the electoral process. Elections are central to the democratic method because they provide the mechanism through which the people can “control” the
leaders. Leaders are not a single group of leaders but several (plural) groups of leaders. Thus, he called his theory of democracy polyarchy: the rule of multiple minorities. On the other side of the electoral process, the competition between leaders for the votes of the people, the fact the people can switch their support from one group of leaders to another ensures that leaders are “relatively responsive” to the people. Dahl listed several requirements for a democracy and on top was the freedom to form and join organizations, namely political parties. Public contestation is not just a competition between individual candidates, but between different groups of leaders, between political parties. Thus, elections (of public officials) and electoral participation (by the electorate) and competition (between parties and candidates) become the two most distinctive features in a democracy (Dahl, 1971: 1-9).

Both Schumpeter and Dahl did not put forward a democratic theory that requires maximum participation from ordinary people because they knew most people tend to be disinterested and apathetic about politics. Dahl also recognized that a relatively small proportion of individuals in any form of social organizations will take up decision-making responsibilities. Most people can only participate in politics through voting during elections, and even in an election some people just do not go to vote (Dahl, 1971). Sartori called the democratic theory put forth by Schumpeter and Dahl the “competitive theory of democracy.” Actually, we can also call this theory of democracy the “electoral theory of democracy” because competition
and election are just two sides of the same democratic coin. Sartori also called democracy defined by Schumpeter and Dahl “minimal democracy” not the maximal democracy (Sartori, 1987: 152-156). What Schumpeter and Dahl offered in their definitions are the basic or lowest criteria of democracy? These are basic criteria, which means once a regime meets these criteria, it is a democratic regime. It also means that when a regime fails to meet these criteria it is not a democratic regime. The definitions they gave are clear-cut criteria; they distinguish or separate a democratic from an undemocratic regime clearly. They meet the “exclusiveness” criterion of classification.

Only by meeting the simple yet strict criterion of exclusiveness in concept formation and classification can the concepts formed by political scientists be useful in analyzing and explaining political phenomena. For example, the political phenomenon-democratic transition is a transition from an undemocratic regime (either a totalitarian regime or an authoritarian regime) into a democratic regime. Democratic transition is a stage, a period or an interval of time; it has a beginning point and an ending point. Before the beginning point the regime must be an undemocratic regime and after the ending point (or completion point) the regime must be a democratic regime. If we do not have a clear-cut definition of democracy, we can not be sure whether a democratic transition has actually occurred and we can not know when a democratic transition began and when it completed. If we use a normative definition of democracy which usually entails high criteria for democracy, then the democratic transition can never be
completed and the phenomenon (or the case) can not be pinned down for analysis and explanation.

Arend Lijphart, a renowned political scientist, divides democratic regimes into two subtypes: majoritarian democracy and consensus democracy. He uses different institutions and rules to distinguish the majoritarian (also called Westminster) model from the consensus model of democracy. The Westminster model (in the United Kingdom) is characterized by (1) concentration of executive power in one-party and bare-majority cabinet; (2) cabinet dominance; (3) two-party system; (4) majoritarian and disproportional system of elections; (5) interest group pluralism; (6) unitary and centralized government; (7) concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature; (8) constitutional flexibility; (9) absence of judicial review; (10) a central bank controlled by the executive (Lijphart, 1999: 10-21); and the consensus model (in Switzerland and Belgium) is characterized by (1) executive power-sharing in a broad coalition cabinet; (2) executive legislative balance of power; (3) multi-party system; (4) proportional representation; (5) interest group corporatism; (6) federal and decentralized government; (7) strong bicameralism; (8) constitutional rigidity; (9) judicial review; (10) central bank independence (Lijphart, 1999: 34-41).

Lijphart argues that the majoritarian model accepts majority rule only as the minimum requirement, the model concentrates political power in the hands of a bare majority and often merely a plurality instead of majority; whereas the consensus model seeks to maximize
the size of these majorities. The majoritarian model of democracy is exclusive, competitive, and adversarial, whereas the consensus model is characterized by inclusiveness, bargaining, and compromise. Apparently, he prefers consensus democracy much more than majoritarian democracy because the former has only a bare or the minimal majority, implying minimal democracy, whereas the later has maximal majority, implying maximal democracy (Lijphart, 1999: 2). Before the 1960s, the standard-bearer of democratic systems was the Anglo-Saxon majoritarian or Westminster model. The majoritarian model was regarded as the best and most democratic, all other forms of democratic governance were regarded as inferior and less democratic. This assumption was challenged and refuted by Lijphart. Thus, Lijphart’s works have incited heated debates and have been subject to repeated criticisms.

Anré Kaiser is right to criticize that Lijphart did not discuss the constitutional engineering process that lead to different political institutions, but he is wrong to criticize that Lijphart did not discuss the effects of different types of democracy on policy outputs (Kaiser, 1997). Actually, Kaiser is right on both points, Lijphart did not discuss the effects of different types of democracy in his 1984 edition entitled “Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries” (Lijphart, 1984), but he added two chapters (15 and 16) to discuss it in his 1999 edition entitled “Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries” (Lijphart, 1999). Lijphart does argue that the two different
patterns of democracy have different policy performance. He finds out that consensus democracies have the better record on effective government and policy-making. He concludes that consensus democracies do clearly outperform majoritarian democracies with regard to the quality of democracy and democratic representation as well as to what he has called the kindness and gentleness of their public policy orientations. He also argues that the federal institutions of consensus democracy do have obvious advantages for large countries and for countries with deep religious and ethnic divisions. Based on these conclusions, he recommends that the consensus democracy is the better option and more attractive choice for countries designing their first democratic constitutions or contemplating democratic reforms, especially for societies that have deep cultural and ethnic cleavages (Lijphart, 1999: 295-296).

Matthijs Bogaards criticizes that Lijphart’s recommendation of consociational (consensus) democracy as against majoritarian democracy for plural societies does not derive from and cannot be supported with his empirical analysis of the performance of these types of democracy in plural (divided) societies (Bogaards, 2000: 417). Because actual measurement of the performance of consensus democracy in divided societies is missing, Nils-Christian Bormann argues that it can not be recommended to constitutional engineers, for there is no empirical evidence for its success in plural (divided) societies (Bormann, 2010: 7). Edeltraud Roller also points out that there are serious flaws in the measurement of Lijphart’s informal
executives-parties dimension, so his empirical finding that consensus democracies outperform majoritarian democracies needs to be put in question (Roller, 2005: 4). Bormann also concludes that the prescription of consensus institutions to all countries independent of their social structure is problematic because the predicted blessings of consensus democracies are based on unstable statistical results or can be attributed to underlying cultural factors (Bormann, 2010: 9).

The author agrees that consensus democracy may be more suitable for countries with deep social cleavages, but not all ten features of consensus democracy are better than those of majoritarian democracy. As we can see, the first and major difference between majoritarian democracy and consensus democracy, according to Lijphart, is that the former is usually a one-party government and the other is usually a coalition government. Whether the government formed is a one-party government or a coalition government depends on the type of party system. When the party system is a predominant party system or a two-party system, we find one-party government and when the party system is multi-party system we find coalition government. And whether the party system is a two-party system or a multi-party system, is, in turn, depends mainly on the type of electoral system used in the parliamentary election. A plurality system usually leads to a two-party system and a proportional representation system usually leads to a multi-party system. Actually, some coalition governments are minimum-winning coalitions; a few are even minority coalitions. One-party governments are usually more stable, easier to make policies
and legislate and hold accountable than coalition governments, especially in polarized multi-party systems. Most scholars prefer a two-party system rather than a multi-party system. Lijphart is an exception. The proportional representation system has its merits, most importantly, proportionality and fairness; it has its problems, too, such as inpersonalization, fragmentation, and polarization.

It is useful, even valuable, to list ten pattern variables of important democratic institutions and rules to see how these different variables influence the political actions of political actors and the outcomes of public policies. It will be even greater if we can study the relationship between these variables, e.g. the relationship between the electoral system, party system and the formation of the government. But classifying democracy into two subtypes, majoritarian, and consensus, and viewing them as polarized or opposite types—one minimal and the other maximal majority—is problematic. How can we say the United Kingdom, the oldest democracy, has an only minimal majority, implying minimal democracy, while Switzerland and Belgium have maximal majority, implying maximal democracy.

This further classification of democratic regimes may be applicable in parliamentary systems and semi-presidential systems, but not very applicable in presidential systems. In a presidential system, the president’s party is the ruling party; no matter if it is the majority or minority party in the parliament (or congress). There is no need to form a coalition government in a presidential system. And it is difficult to use a proportional representation system in presidential
elections. Many democratic regimes cannot be classified as either majoritarian democracy or consensus democracy. Thus, the classification does not meet the criterion of inclusiveness (exhaustiveness). For example, the United States has a one-party government, a two-party system, a majoritarian system of elections and interest group pluralism, characteristics of majoritarian democracy; but the U.S. also has a federal and decentralized government, strong bicameralism, judicial review and central bank independence, characteristics of consensus democracy, so which category should we put the U.S. into, majoritarian democracy or consensus democracy?

Kaiser argues that theoretically Lijphart’s typology is superior to a simple presidential/parliamentary differentiation (Kaiser, 1997: 423). Bormann also argues that Lijphart’s typology is more exhaustive than the previous presidential/parliamentary typology (Bormann, 2010: 3). The comparison is odd because presidential/parliamentary typology is a classification of constitutional systems, not a classification of political regimes. Lijphart’s topology includes many institutional characteristics (that is what Kaiser and Bormann mean by exhaustiveness) but does not apply to many empirical cases. Bormann himself points out that Lijphart’s inductive approach leads to the exclusion of presidentialism and a bias toward parliamentary systems (Bormann, 2010: 3). Since only one-third of all democratic systems in the world are parliamentary, while the other two-thirds are presidential or semi-presidential (Fuchs, 2000: 40), the classification is hardly exhaustive (inclusive). Bormann also points out that, due to Lijphart’s
inductive analysis, his typology cannot capture patterns of democracy in Eastern Europe as well as Asia and only coarsely describes single cases in Southern Africa. He concludes that Lijphart’s typology seems to be incapable of capturing the patterns of democracy outside of his original sample (Bormann, 2010: 5-6).

Using ten pattern variables to classify democratic regimes into two opposite subtypes is fine theoretically, but we will definitely encounter problems when we want to put democratic regimes in this empirical world into one of these two types. Because many democratic regimes exhibit some majoritarian and some consensual characteristics, therefore, we can put them into both two categories. This is a clear violation of the either-or criterion of exclusiveness. Lijphart must have been aware of this problem. He finds only two countries, New Zealand and the United Kingdom approaching the prototype of the majoritarian model, and only two other countries, Switzerland and Belgium approaching the prototype of consensus model. On table 13.2 in his 1984 book, he created two other categories: (1) majoritarian-federal, regimes approximating majoritarian model but has a federal system, and (2) consensus-unitary, regimes approximating consensus model but has a unitary system. He listed 6 countries under the majoritarian-federal type, 11 countries under the consensus-unitary type, more than a half of 21 countries listed in his book. On table 13.3 in the same book, Lijphart created yet another type: intermediate type and listed 7 countries under dimension I and 8 countries under dimension II, a total of 15 countries (Lijphart, 1984: 216-218).
Because on about half of the dimensions the United States approximates the majoritarian model and on another half of the dimensions the U.S. approximates the consensus model, Lijphart called the American democracy the most prominent example of a mixed or an intermediate and frequently a deviant type of democracy (Lijphart, 1984:36, 217). Adding several types to his original typology changes his typology from a dichotomous to a multiple one and clearly shows that his original classification is not exhaustive. Contrasting different institutions and rules of democracies and studying their different political effects are good, but in terms of classification Lijphart’s classification has problems. If it is a multiple classification, with an intermediate (or mixed) type and other types, then the problem (with the criterion of exclusiveness) is lessened. The problem is lessened but not solved because adding too many subtypes makes the classification much more complicated and messy. But as a dichotomous classification with two opposing types, majoritarianism v.s. consensus, with so many intermediate, mixed and deviant cases, it does have problems with both two criteria of classification.

III. Totalitarianism v.s. Authoritarianism

The classificatory concept, totalitarianism or totalitarian regime, was formed and defined by Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski (Friedrich & Brzezinski, 1965). They saw a new modern undemocratic regime, exemplified by Stalin’s communist regime and Hitler’s fascist
regime which emerged in the early 20th century that was very different from old traditional political regimes such as dictatorship, despotism or absolute monarchy. Thus, they formed the concept totalitarianism to call this kind of regime. They pointed out that a totalitarian regime has six distinctive features: (1) a totalistic ideology; (2) a single party committed to this ideology and usually led by one man, the dictator; (3) a fully developed secret police and three kinds of monopoly or more precisely monopolistic control; namely that of (4) mass communications, (5) operational weapons, and (6) all organizations including economic ones, thus involving a centrally planned economy. Immediately after listing these six features, they simplified them into three: a totalistic ideology, a party reinforced by a secret police and a monopoly of the three major forms of interpersonal confrontation in industrial mass society. They argued that the totalitarian regime is characterized by the destruction of the line between state and society, the emergence of “total” politicization of society, and the “total” control of the society by the party and its affiliates. (Friedrich & Brzezinski, 1965; Friedrich, 1969: 126)

The first step of concept formation is giving a general noun to the political phenomenon. By naming the new political regime “totalitarian” regime, Friedrich and Brzezinski tried to emphasize the major feature of this political regime: “total”. According to them, the first and foremost feature of totalitarian regime is a “totalistic” ideology. The totalitarian regime is characterized by the “total” politicization and “total” control of the society. Hitler and Mussolini
liked to use the word “total”, they established Nazi and Fascist parties to control and mobilize the whole population and resources to wage the Second World War. They called the war a “total war,” Stalin used Communist Party of the Soviet Union to control and mobilize people to participate in political campaigns such as “the great purge” thus; the whole society was totally politicized. This kind of complete control and mobilization is called “totalitarian rule,” and this kind of regime is called totalitarian regime. Totalitarian regime even pursues the goal of shaping a “new man.” Thus eliminating the line between state-controlled and private spheres of life and leading to the ultimate invasion of privacy.

A totalistic ideology has blueprints, ideas, thoughts and beliefs about every aspect of human life. It wants to reform every aspect of human life (politics, society, family, even individuals’ thoughts). It is very strong, or the strongest in ideological intensity and it asks its believers to commit to its realization and to dedicate themselves and sometimes even sacrifice their lives if necessary. A totalistic ideology is also very exclusionary; it is treated as the only truth and any other ideologies, ideas, thoughts, and theories to the contrary or different are viewed as heresy and are censured. A totalitarian party usually spends a lot of money and effort on political socialization (political education and propaganda) to make the people learn and accept the ideology. For this purpose, the party controls all mass media to make sure that ideological messages are ubiquitous and no one can escape their bombardment. And the ideological position of a totalitarian regime and
a totalitarian party is usually very extreme on the political (ideological) spectrum, either on the extreme right or on the extreme left. In short, totalitarian regime is an extreme type, or an ideal type meaning that it is the most extremely ideological regime or party one can imagine.

In reality, few regimes or parties can reach such an extreme ideological position. No regime or party can totally and completely reach, penetrate, control and politicize the whole society. Perhaps Stalin’s regime, Hitler’s regime, or Mao’s regime approached that extreme or ideal type, but the regime after them must relax or lessen some features of the extreme type. The economic reform launched after Mao passed away necessarily lessened the totalitarian party’s (Chinese Communist Party’s) control over the economy. And the post-Mao regime in China has not launched large-scale political movements like the Great Leap Forward and the Culture Revolution. Thus, we can not be sure whether the political regime in China after Mao can still be classified as a totalitarian regime or it should be called an authoritarian regime. Furthermore, there is another problem with this classificatory concept of a totalitarian regime. In terms of ideological position, the/a Fascist Party is on the extreme right and the/a Communist Party is on the extreme left. Because of ideological distance and the fact the two parties have very different ideologies, they oppose each other vehemently. Yet, Friedrich and Brzezinski did not further divide totalitarian regimes into two different types but put them together into one basket. Apparently they thought only difference in ideological position is not important as long as all other important
characteristics are the same.

After World War II, the world was divided into two blocs: the democratic bloc and the communist bloc. Communist regimes can all be put into the totalitarian category, but not all countries in the democratic bloc are democratic. Many countries in the Third World belong to or affiliated with the democratic bloc are neither totalitarian nor democratic countries. Thus, we need a new category, a new classificatory concept to call the political regimes in these countries. The new concept, authoritarian regime, was formed and defined by Juan Linz. Based on an analysis of the Franco regime in Spain, particularly after 1945, Linz formed the concept of the authoritarian regime as a third type of political regime, distinct from both democratic and totalitarian regimes. Linz conceived the authoritarian regime as a type sui generis rather than on a continuum between democracy and totalitarianism. He defined an authoritarian regime as “the political system with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without an elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some point in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones” (Linz, 1964: 255). This definition tells more about what an authoritarian regime is not than what an authoritarian regime is. Linz defined the concept by contrasting it both with the democratic regime and totalitarian regime. Only the first phrase was given to contrast with the democratic regime,
democracy is often equated with pluralism; the rest of the definition was given to contrast with the totalitarian regime.

An authoritarian regime is quite different from a democratic regime, thus, there is no need to distinguish them as much. An authoritarian regime and a totalitarian regime are somewhat more similar, both of them are undemocratic regimes, thus there is more need to distinguish them more clearly. Linz defined the concept with the criterion of exclusiveness in mind. When undemocratic regimes are classified into two types: totalitarian and authoritarian, they must be clearly defined and distinguished from each other. In other words, they must be mutually exclusive; otherwise we can just put them into one category. Although Linz has done his best, it is still very difficult to differentiate the two types. The difference between the authoritarian regime and the democratic regime is clearly a difference in kind, but the difference between an authoritarian regime and a totalitarian regime is somewhat more of a difference in degree. It is difficult to decide whether to classify the Chinese Communist regime after Mao into either a totalitarian regime or an authoritarian regime.

Gordon Skilling and Juan Linz called the communist regimes after Stalin and Mao: “Communist post totalitarian authoritarian regimes” (Skilling, 1971; Linz, 1975). However, the term “communist post totalitarian authoritarian regimes” is a bit too long and Skilling and Linz did not define it. They just treated it as a subtype of authoritarian regimes. Juan Linz did offer a typology of authoritarian regimes. He divided authoritarian regimes into seven types (or subtypes): 1.
bureaucratic-military authoritarian regime; 2. organic statism; 3. mobilizational authoritarian regimes in post-democratic societies; 4. post-independence mobilizational authoritarian regimes; 5. racial and ethnic “democracies”; 6. “defective” and “pre-totalitarian” political situations and regimes, and 7. post-totalitarian authoritarian regimes (Linz, 1975: 273-353). Trying to be inclusive, this typology was a little trivial and too complicated. Furthermore, the names of some of these types are quite awkward and, in addition, mobilization and democracy are incompatible with authoritarianism, they can not be put together. Thus, this topology has been accepted by few political scientists.

As mentioned above, based on the Franco regime, Linz formed the concept-authoritarian regime. General Franco was a military strongman and the Franco regime was a military regime, the regime was under military rule. After World War II, many authoritarian regimes in the Third World have been established after military coups and ruled by a military strongman or a small ruling group called a military junta. Thus, it is natural that at the beginning the authoritarian regime was equated with the military authoritarian regime. Only later on did scholars realize that there were other nonmilitary authoritarian regimes. Samuel Huntington and Clement Moore in 1970 analyzed some authoritarian regimes that had been established and ruled by an “established one-party system,” thus the concept of a one-party authoritarian regime was formed. Huntington and Moore distinguished between exclusionary and revolutionary one-party systems and
between revolutionary and established one-party systems (Huntington and Moore, 1970). But more importantly, later on, Giovanni Sartori distinguished between authoritarian and totalitarian one-party systems (Sartori, 1976: 221-230). Military authoritarian regimes usually do not allow party politics. They usually attribute the failure of the civilian government to vicious competition between political parties. So they usually call off elections, outlaw the formation of parties, and the crackdown on party activities. A one-party authoritarian regime is ruled by a single party and this party usually limits the right of the people to form other parties or do not allow other parties to compete with itself on an equal and fair basis. The military authoritarian regime is ruled by the military, the one-party authoritarian regime is ruled by a single party; it is easy to distinguish one from another. They are two distinctive types of authoritarian regimes.

By the same token, it is quite easy to distinguish military authoritarian regimes ruled by the military from totalitarian regimes ruled by one party. Now we have come to the most difficult point, one-party authoritarian regime shares one more similar characteristic with the totalitarian regime in addition to the fact that both of them are undemocratic. Both one-party authoritarian regimes and totalitarian regimes are ruled by a single party. Both of them are one-party systems. It is much more difficult to distinguish one-party authoritarian regimes from totalitarian regimes and thus there is more need to distinguish them. The single party in totalitarian regimes can be called totalitarian party and the one party in one-party authoritarian regime can be called
authoritarian party. Totalitarian party and authoritarian party are quite different parties. Only by distinguishing a totalitarian party from an authoritarian party can a totalitarian regime be distinguished from a one-party authoritarian regime.

Giovanni Sartori divided the one-party system into three different types: totalitarian, authoritarian, and pragmatic parties. Sartori used five criteria to classify them, but the main criterion for this classification is ideological intensity along the ideology-pragmatism spectrum (Sartori, 1976). Here totalitarian party and pragmatic party are extreme (or ideal) types. The ideology of a totalitarian party is extremely strong and totalistic while the ideology of a pragmatic party is very weak, almost non-existent. In reality, few parties approach that extreme position. The ideological intensity of an authoritarian party is medium, that is, weaker and non-totalistic. The major difference between a totalitarian regime and an authoritarian regime is that the former has a totalistic ideology while the latter is “without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities,” according to Linz’s definition. Linz used the Franco regime as the model to form and define the concept of an authoritarian regime, thus his definition fits better with the military authoritarian regime than the one-party authoritarian regime. Actually, a one-party authoritarian regime usually has some kind of ideology, while a military authoritarian regime usually does not.

However, one-party authoritarian regime (and authoritarian party) and totalitarian regime (and totalitarian party) are quite different in
regard to ideology. As mentioned above, the ideology of a totalitarian regime and a totalitarian party is totalistic, very extreme (either on the extreme right or on the extreme left) and exclusionary. The ideology of one-party authoritarian regime and authoritarian party is non-totalistic in the sense that it only wants to reform certain aspects of political life, not all aspects of the society. It has a lesser degree of ideological intensity. It is more moderate, calmer, not having an ideological fever, so to speak. It is more tolerant toward other ideologies, thoughts, and theories. Its ideological position is usually center to right, not extreme right or extreme left.

As mentioned above, the totalitarian regime and party is characterized by its total reach, penetration, control, and most importantly total politicization of the society. A totalitarian regime and party is also characterized by high degree of coercion, extraction and mobilization. A totalitarian regime or party will not hesitate to use coercive power (police or armed forces) to crackdown or suppress opposition and dissent. A totalitarian regime (or party) often mobilizes a lot of people, even the whole population to participate in a series of political movement. An authoritarian party (and one-party authoritarian regime) neither has the power nor the ambition of penetrating and controlling the whole society. It controls mainly the political aspects of social life. It is characterized not by the total politicization of the society, but to the contrary, is characterized by the “depoliticization” of the society. It has a lesser degree of coercion, extraction, and mobilization. It does not have intensive and extensive
mobilization. It may mobilize a few people to participate in parades and celebrations on national holidays to show off the loyalty and support of the people toward the regime and the party.

In relation to outer groups (civic, social or interest groups), a totalitarian party is roughly destructive. It does not allow any social groups to freely form and exist outside the party, no matter whether the group is politically relevant. It is also destructive of both subsystem (subunit) and subgroup autonomy. An authoritarian party is characterized by exclusionary policies toward outer groups. It restricts political activities of outer groups, social groups, especially potentially politically relevant groups, such as trade unions, farmers and student associations, they are carefully kept out of politics. Except for political activities, social groups are left alone to pursue their own interests. An authoritarian party impedes subgroup (especially politically relevant group) autonomy, but tolerates, at least de facto, some degree of sub-group (especially politically irrelevant group) autonomy. In a totalitarian party, the power of the totalitarian dictator is unbounded and the way he uses power is often unpredictable. In an authoritarian party, the power of the authoritarian ruler is also unbounded, but the use of his power is usually confined within predictable limits. Why did Sartori use five criteria to classify one-party system into three types or subtypes: totalitarian, authoritarian, and pragmatic parties? It is because the main criterion-ideological intensity-is a difference in degree; it is very difficult to measure, thus we need more criteria to distinguish one type from another. Each criterion or variable does not
give us a clear-cut identification, nonetheless, each type or subtype is well characterized by a distinctive syndrome or a unique complex of these criteria, and we can easily distinguish one type from another.
IV. Bureaucratic Authoritarianism

In 1973, Guillermo O’Donnell published a seminal book entitled “Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics” and initiated a great debate between social-economic development and political change in Latin America (O’Donnell, 1973). In the 1950s and 1960s, most scholars, especially modernization theorists, expected that industrialization and modernization would bring about democracy and equality to the developing areas in the Third World (Packenham, 1973). O’Donnell put forth a new hypothesis that in the context of delayed development (developing areas) industrialization and modernization are more likely to lead to authoritarianism than democracy.

O’Donnell formed the concept “bureaucratic authoritarianism” or “bureaucratic authoritarian regime” to call the political systems that were implanted in Brazil in 1964 and in Argentina in 1966 (O’Donnell, 1973). Although these two countries were ruled by the military, he contends, they were ruled by the military as an institution, rather than exclusively by individual military rulers. In addition, the military officers appeared to adopt technocratic, bureaucratic approaches to policy making and they seemed to form a coup or ruling coalition with the civilian technocrats (or bureaucrats). Thus, he added the adjective “bureaucratic” with the term “authoritarianism” and called these regimes “bureaucratic authoritarianism.” This label has come to be an
important addition to the typologies of political regimes.

Brazil and Argentina moved in the mid-1960s to exclude the urban popular sector (working class and segments of the lower middle class) from the national political arena by refusing to meet its political demands and denying its leaders access to political power. Exclusion of political participation was achieved by direct coercion and/or by closing electoral channels of political access. The term “bureaucratic” suggests the crucial features that are specific to an authoritarian system of high modernization. The process of modernization had led to the emergence of technocratic roles, the growth of organizational strength, and the pivotal role played by large (public and private) bureaucracies. O’Donnell admitted that “bureaucratic authoritarianism” was an awkward term and he did not give it a clear definition in his 1973 book. O’Donnell also included the post-1973 period in Chile and Uruguay and Mexico in the 1970s as cases of bureaucratic authoritarian regimes. Other examples include the later Franco period in Spain and authoritarian systems in several Eastern European countries between the two world wars (O’Donnell, 1973).

In an article published later, O’Donnell (1979) listed in detail 8 principal characteristics of bureaucratic-authoritarian (BA) state:

1. It is, first and foremost, a social relationship of domination by a highly oligopolistic and transnationalized bourgeoisie. In other words, the principal social base of the BA state is this upper bourgeoisie.

2. In institutional terms, it is comprised of organizations in
which specialists in coercion have decisive weight, as well as those whose aim is to achieve “normalization” of the economy. The two tasks that the BA state is committed to accomplish: the restoration of “order” in society by means of the political deactivation of the popular sector and the normalization of the economy.

3. It is a system of political exclusion of a previously activated popular sector which is subjected to strict controls in an effort to eliminate its earlier active role in the national political arena. After achieving the normalization of the economy, the BA state will reinitiate a highly transnationalized pattern of economic growth characterized by a skewed distribution of resources.

4. The political exclusion involves the suppression of citizenship and includes the liquidation of the institutions of political democracy (political parties among them).

5. BA is also a system of economic exclusion of the popular sector, inasmuch as it promotes a pattern of capital accumulation which is highly skewed toward benefiting the large oligopolistic units. The preexisting inequities in the distribution of social resources are thus sharply increased.

6. It promotes an increasing transnationalization of the productive structure, resulting in a further denationalization of society.

7. It endeavors to “depoliticize” social issues by dealing with
them in terms of the supposedly neutral and objective criteria of technical rationality.

8. It closes the democratic channels of access to the government for the representation of popular class interests. Such access is limited to those who stand at the apex of large organizations, especially the armed forces and large oligopolistic enterprises (O’Donnell, 1979: 292-293).

These characteristics of the BA regimes are best summarized by David Collier into a more concise definition: these systems are “excluding” and emphatically non-democratic. Central actors in the dominant coalition include high-level technocrats—military—and civilian, within and outside the state—working in a close association with foreign capital. This new elite eliminates electoral competitions and severely controls the political participation of the popular sector. Public policy is centrally concerned with promoting advanced industrialization (Collier, 1979: 24).

In his 1973 book, O’Donnell focused his analysis on the factors that led to attempts to impose bureaucratic-authoritarianism in Brazil and Argentina during the 1960s. O’Donnell treated BA regimes as dependent variables and viewed the emergence of BA regimes as the consequences of delayed dependent capital industrialization. Political transformations, especially the transition to a BA system, derive from the social and political tensions produced by this kind of industrialization during the so-called “populist” period, e.g. the governments of Vargas in Brazil (1930-1945 and 1950-1954) and of
Peron in Argentina (1946 to 1955). The state adopts economic nationalism and import substitution policies by promoting the production of consumer goods, supporting domestic industry and expanding domestic market. He suggested that this kind of "horizontal" industrial growth had created the basis for populist coalitions that corporated and activated the urban popular sector-the lower middle and working class groups. As the "easy" stage of import substitution was exhausted, leading to the appearance of economic "bottlenecks," such as inflation and balance-of-payments crises, and an overload of demands generated by popular sector activation. Meanwhile, high levels of social differentiation which accompany industrialization also lead to increased significance of technocratic roles both in civilian and military bureaucracies. The technocrats have a low level of tolerance for the ongoing political and economic crises and perceive popular activation as the prime obstacle to economic growth. The growing frustration of technocrats with existing political and economic conditions encourages the formation of a "coup coalition" that ultimately established a repressive BA regime (O’Donnell, 1973).

The concept of the BA regime is a huge theoretical contribution that O’Donnell made for the literature of comparative politics, because by arguing that modernization leads to a BA regime rather than democracy completely shook up the basic assumption of modernization theory shared by most political scientists (in America) in the 1950s and 1960s. Based on detailed analysis on the factors that lead to the
establishment of a BA regime in Argentina in 1966, O’Donnell’s arguments are quite persuasive. The timeliness of his 1973 book, together with theoretical implications of the concept, stimulated considerable discussion and debate which culminated in the publication of a volume entitled “The New Authoritarianism in Latin America” devoted to the exploration of themes and issues raised by O’Donnell (Collier, 1979). More recently the concept of the BA regime was used to refer to other countries and regions beyond Latin America, e.g. Burce Cumings (1988) and Hyug Baeg Im (1987) called the South Korean regime during the 1970s a BA regime, and John Harbeson (1998) also described Ethiopia as a BA regime.

Most discussions and debate on the concept of BA center on the explanans (what explains) of O’Donnell’s theory—the economic determinants. David Collier rightly points out that a BA regime has not appeared in all of the industrially more advanced countries of Latin America. This form of the regime has appeared in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, but not in other relatively advanced countries, e.g. competitive regimes persist in Columbia and Venezuela (Collier, 1979: 8-9). Modernization (or the economic determinants proposed by O’Donnell) is not the sufficient condition for the emergence of a BA regime. Although Collier also points out that in Mexico, the end of the initial phase of industrialization occurred within the context of firmly established authoritarian control, with the result that the transition to more advanced industrialization was accompanied by a much greater continuity of political institutions (Collier, 1979: 28). The fact that a
BA regime was established in Mexico before the appearance of economic determinants proposed by O’Donnell also shows that these factors are not necessary conditions for BA regime. Jose Serra critically analyzes the so-called the “deepening” of industrialization and finds out that it may be irrelevant in Chile and Uruguay because the small scale of the economies in these two countries (Serra, 1979). After criticizing Cumming’s viewpoint, James Cotton argues that BA theory is inapplicable in the Korean case because the timing of the Korean shift to intensified authoritarianism simply does not match the adoption of export-led industrialization, which triggers such a shift according to classic BA theory (Cotton, 1992).

O’Donnell’s arguments in his BA theory has a Marxian undertone and are very similar to the arguments of dependence theory except that the explanandum (what is explained) in BA theory is the BA regime itself, whereas the explanandum of dependence theory is the phenomenon called “underdevelopment” in the developing areas. Fernando H. Cardoso, a famous dependence theorist, also contributed an article entitled “The Characterization of Authoritarian Regimes” to the volume edited by Collier. In that article, Cardoso (1979) argues that to clarify the characterization of contemporary authoritarian politics it is essential to distinguish between the concept of the political regime and the concept of state. By “regime” he means the formal rules that link the main political institutions, the concept has a lower level of abstraction. The concept of “state” has the highest level of abstraction; it refers to a mode of class domination (in Marxian
Cardoso finds it more useful to use the term BA to refer not to the form of state, but to the type of political regime (Cardoso, 1979). In his original work, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarians the referent of BA was the “political regime,” but in his 1979 article, “Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State,” O’Donnell shifted the referent to the “state,” a change of considerable theoretical significance (Remmer and Merkx, 1982). That is why O’Donnell characterized his BA state, first and foremost, as a class domination by the upper bourgeoisie—a highly oligopolized and transnationalized bourgeoisie. As O’Donnell raised the level of abstraction of his BA concept, he might have hoped to cover more cases but in actuality he made his concept applicable to fewer cases. Most BA regimes mentioned by O’Donnell are ruled and dominated by the military, not dominated by the bourgeoisie or capitalist class.

Several scholars have proposed reconceptualization or another theory to explain authoritarian regimes after criticizing O’Donnell’s BA theory. For example, Hector E. Schamis proposed that authoritarian regimes established in Chile, Uruguay and Argentina in the 1970s were better called neoconservative military regimes than BA regimes (Schamis, 1991). James Cotton suggested that to understand the state in South Korea state autonomy theory is better than BA theory (Cotton, 1992). Remmer and Merkx called O’Donnell’s key concept, bureaucratic authoritarianism, an “ideal type” in Weberian terms which creates particular problems for the analysis of similarities and differences among cases of BA rule (Remmer and Merkx, 1982).
But Remmer and Merkx did not propose any other model to analyze these cases. As mentioned above, O’Donnell emphasizes the role of technocrats, both in civilian and military bureaucracies and the technocratic orientations and approaches to public policies. He views the military institution and the bureaucracies in the civilian government as the same and he also argues that the military and civilian technocrats form a “coup coalition” and rule together after the BA regime is established. Actually, O’Donnell’s BA concept explicitly dismissed the military nature of BA regimes as “typologically inconsequential”. In O’Donnell’s view, “what matters most are the policies of each system and the social problems to which it responds, the coalition on which it is based, and whether or not it attempts to exclude and deactivate the popular sector (O’Donnell, 1973: 112), not whether these authoritarian regimes are established and ruled by the military.

The military is the institution that controls the state’s coercive power and its main duty is national security and defense. The military officer, the man on horseback, may have some “expertise” and learn some technology, but it is expertise in using armed forces, military strategies, and tactics, and the technology they know is military technology. In short, the characteristics of the military and soldiers are quite different from the bureaucracy and the bureaucrats (or technocrats). The military may form a so-called “coup coalition” with some technocrats in the civilian bureaucracy (in charge of economic development), but in a military coup it is the military that topples the
O’Donnell never denies the fact that most of his cases of BA regime are ruled by the military except Mexico, which is ruled by a single party (the PRI and as such Mexico should be called a one-party authoritarian regime rather than a BA regime). In fact, most authors in Collier’s volume use the term military regime or military government much more often than the term BA regime. Thus, it is unnecessary and superfluous to call these cases BA regimes. More importantly and seriously the concept of BA regime diminishes the role of the military and directs our attention to look for economic determinants and neglect political determinants for explaining the emergence of authoritarian regimes. Fermin Adriano also criticized O’Donnell’s use of ambiguous terms and his reductionist treatment of the political sphere and the total failure to distinguish different forms of the regime dominated by the bourgeois class, e.g. bourgeois-democratic, authoritarian, and populist regimes, etc. (Adriano, 1984).

In the field of comparative politics, there is another concept, military intervention (MI), which means the military in a country intervenes in the country’s domestic politics, especially when the military launches military coups, topples the civilian government and imposes military rule in the country. Military intervention in politics has been extremely common, especially during the first stage of industrial development, in many developing countries in the Third World. From the 1950s to the 1970s, military coups frequently occurred and military authoritarian regimes were established in several
countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Since military intervention (MI) in politics is so widespread, many hypotheses and generalizations have been put forth by political scientists to explain this important political phenomenon. These hypotheses and theories can be labeled MI literature which is quite different from the BA literature although the two literatures try to explain the same or similar phenomenon. There are many important works in the MI literature, e.g., Samuel P. Huntington (1957), The Soldier and the State; Lucian W. Pye (1961), Armies in the Process of Political Modernization; Samuel E. Finer (1962), The Man on Horse Back; John J. Johnson (1962), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries; Robert D. Putnam (1967), Toward Explaining Military Intervention in Latin America; Morris Janowitz (1971), The Military in the Political Development of New Nations; Alfred Stepan (1971), The Military in Politics: Changing Pattern in Brazil; and Eric A. Nordlinger (1977), Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Government, etc.. Due to limit of scope and time, we can not review this MI literature and compare the explainability between the MI theories and the BA theory, except to say that MI literature emphasizes the role of the military and soldiers rather than the bureaucracy and technocrats. The important point to stress is the importance of conceptualization, by giving the phenomenon we want to explain different names (nouns) the researcher will look at different aspects (places) of the phenomenon and draw different explanations (conclusions).

Actually, the authoritarian regimes established in Brazil in 1964
and in Argentina in 1966 were ruled by the military, not by bureaucracies in the civilian government, and were established in the aftermath of military coups (Collier, 1979). The authoritarian regimes established in Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina in the 1970s were also preceded by military coups and ruled by the military (Schamis, 1991). Three consecutive authoritarian regimes in South Korea in the 1970s were also ruled by the military and established after military coups (Im, 1987). In order to promote industrialization and economic development and govern more effectively and smoothly, the military ruler(s) employed a few technocrats as (economic and/or finance) ministers to govern with them. Thus, Argentine and Brazilian regimes after the mid-1960s and authoritarian regimes in Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, and South Korea were military authoritarian regimes, not bureaucratic authoritarian regimes. In fact, we can not find a real bureaucratic authoritarian regime (if defined literally that it is ruled by the bureaucracy) in the empirical world. Perhaps, dichotomous classification of authoritarian regimes into two types: the military authoritarian regime and the one-party authoritarian regime is enough.

As mentioned above, Linz divided authoritarian regimes into seven subtypes in his typology of authoritarian regimes. Among these seven types, Linz listed bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes as the first and most frequent subtype. Linz defined this subtype as “authoritarian regimes in which a coalition predominated by but was not exclusively controlled by the military. A coalition of army officers and bureaucrats establishes control of the government, excludes or
includes some groups, without the commitment to specific ideology, acts pragmatically within the limits of their bureaucratic mentality, and neither creates nor allows a mass single party to play a dominant role” (Linz, 1975: 285). But among these two groups of people, which one is more predominant: army officers or bureaucrats? In fact, in most of these regimes, army officers play a dominant role while bureaucrats play a subservient role. At the most we can call them military-bureaucratic authoritarian regimes, or maybe it is more appropriate just to call them military authoritarian regimes.

V. Electoral (Competitive) Authoritarian Regime

Beginning in the mid-1970s, during the so-called “third wave” of democratization (Huntington, 1991), and the decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the breakdown of totalitarian communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the world saw a great increase in the number of democracies. During the process of democratic transition from authoritarianism, many authoritarian regimes, especially one-party authoritarian regimes, held some kind of elections and allowed some form of competition, some even did this before the democratization process began, perhaps as means to consolidate authoritarian rule. Thus, we seem to have many intermediate, mixed or hybrid regimes which exhibited characteristics of both democracy and authoritarianism. Many of these mixed or hybrid systems seem to be
stable and have persisted until today without any transition to democracy. *Journal of Democracy* in April 2002 published several articles dealing with the so-called hybrid regimes that combined democratic rules with authoritarian governance. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way (2002) called these hybrid regimes “competitive authoritarian regimes,” while Larry Diamond (2002) and Andreas Schedler (2002) called them “electoral authoritarian regimes.” A variety of labels have been given to these hybrid systems, but these two terms—electoral and competitive authoritarian regimes—have gained general currency among many political scientists. Thus, we have another two types (or subtypes) of authoritarian regimes. However, these two terms or concepts actually refer to the same kind of regime; we can consider them as one type. These types of regimes can be called either “competitive authoritarian regimes” or “electoral authoritarian regimes” (Levitsky and Way, 2002; Diamond, 2002; Schedler, 2002).

Levitsky and Way (2002) argue that competitive authoritarianism must be distinguished from democracy on the one hand and full-scale authoritarianism on the other. In competitive authoritarian regimes, formal democratic institutions are used and viewed as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority. The regime manipulates those democratic rules so as to make the competitive field unequal or unfair between government and opposition. Authoritarian leaders violate democratic criteria so often and to such extent that the regime fails to meet minimum standards for democracy. Yet if
competitive authoritarian regimes fall short of democracy, they also fall short of full-scale authoritarianism. Although incumbents in these regimes routinely manipulate formal democratic rules, they are unable to eliminate them or reduce them to a mere façade. Democratic institutions adopted by authoritarian rulers to provide arena of contestation through which opposition forces may periodically challenge, weaken and occasionally even defeat authoritarian incumbents. Levitsky and Way point out four such arenas are of particular importance: (1) the electoral arena; (2) the legislature; (3) the judiciary; and (4) the media. They also point out three paths to competitive authoritarianism: (1) the decay of a full-blown authoritarian regime; (2) the collapse of an authoritarian regime; and (3) the decay of a democratic regime. Finally, they point out that the coexistence of democratic rules and autocratic methods aimed at keeping authoritarian rulers in power creates an inherent source of instability and uncertainty. Although some hybrid regimes (Mexico, Senegal, and Taiwan) underwent democratization in the 1990s, others (Azerbaijan and Belarus) moved in a distinctly authoritarian direction. Still others either remained stable or moved in multiple directions (Malaysia, Russia, Ukraine, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) (Levitsky and Way, 2002).

Based on Diamond’s tables (Diamond, 2002), Schedler (2002) calculated that as the “third wave” of global democratization rolled toward its 30th anniversary in the year of 2004, less than half (45%) of all countries outside the realm of Western democracies qualified as
either liberal or electoral democracies. The remainder host variants of authoritarianism, with EA (electoral authoritarian) regimes making up more than two-thirds (69.9%) of all autocracies (authoritarian regimes) and 38.4% of all countries in the Third World. With so many existing EA regimes in the world, it seems we do need to give these regimes a typological concept and clearly define it. Schedler defines EA regimes as regimes that hold elections and tolerate some pluralism and interparty competition, but at the same time violate minimal democratic norms so severely and systematically that it makes no sense to classify them as democracies. These EA regimes do not represent limited, deficient, or distorted forms of democracy. They are instances of authoritarian rule. By organizing periodic elections, they try to obtain at least a semblance of democratic legitimacy, hoping to satisfy external as well as internal actors and to cement their continued hold on power. Democracy, some argue is a matter of either/or, others argue is a matter of more-or-less. Schedler argues that EA combines insights from both perspectives. The EA concept introduces gradation while retaining the idea of thresholds, EA regimes are neither democratic nor fully authoritarian (undemocratic). They inhabit the wide and foggy zone between liberal democracy and closed authoritarianism. He uses seven dimensions to construct a chain of democratic choice for the gradation and “contextualized comparison” of EA regimes, while attentive to nuance and “gradation,” the chain also takes into account “qualitative leaps” (Schedler, 2002).

While the concept electoral (competitive) authoritarian regime has
gained wide currency among political scholars it also invites some criticisms. Matthijs Bogaard (2009) criticizes that EA regime is not fully defined, boundaries are not clearly specified and coding decisions seem arbitrary. The identification of EA regimes is not based on operationalization of common classificatory criteria, but on Freedom House ratings, for Schedler, all countries with multiparty elections and average Freedom House political rights scores between four and six are EA regimes. No indication is given over which time period scores should be averaged. No reasons are given for the cut-off points, which do not correspond to Freedom House’s cut-off points between free and partly free types and between partly free and not free types. Many cases that contributors to Schedler’s 2006 edited volume regard as EA regimes based on Freedom House scores (Schedler, 2006), Freedom House considers electoral democracies. Bogaard also criticizes Schedler for promoting the concept of electoral authoritarianism at the expense of defective democracies. Claiming that most regimes in the non-Western world are new forms of authoritarian rule, it follows that they should not be analyzed as diminished democracies but as EA regimes. Bogaard proposed a “double-root strategy” that maps the full range of contemporary regimes from both ends of the political spectrum: democracy and authoritarianism (Bogaard, 2009). The author agrees with most of Bogaard’s criticisms except his criticism on the so-called “single-root-strategy,” of the EA approach. The author agrees with Juan Linz and Schedler that these new forms of authoritarian regimes
may be better described as a diminished form of authoritarianism rather than a diminished form of democracy (Linz, 2000: 34; Schedler, 2002: 52), although Schedler’s third path to competitive authoritarianism is the decay of a democratic regime (an inner contradiction or inconsistence within Schedler’s arguments).

After reviewing four works on electoral (competitive) authoritarianism, Yonatan L. Morse (2012) concludes that much of the research on democratization suffered from a teleological bias, a distinct political trajectory ending with democracy was often assumed. The study of EA regimes marks a conceptual shift in comparative politics; scholars are now beginning to understand these regimes in terms of authoritarian durability. Are unfair elections serve mainly authoritarian functions in perpetuating authoritarianism or as a catalyst for democratization? Morse argues that frequent unfair elections are a double-edged sword: sustaining authoritarianism yet sowing the seeds of its downfall. Morse agrees with Gerardo Munck’s claim that research on EA regimes is guilty of methodological sloppiness and ignorant of standard practices in large N studies (Munk, 2006). Morse suggests that the next stage for research on EA regimes needs to be case driven-contextual small-to medium-N comparisons with the explicit goal of midrange theory building and concept formation. Closer interaction with data, Morse claims, will help clarify the factors that make elections democratic or authoritarian (Morse, 2012).

After reviewing this EA literature, the author feels that it is not always clear what is meant by the term electoral (competitive)
authoritarianism and whether the field of comparative politics even needs this new terminology. The term, “electoral (competitive) authoritarianism” has conceptualization problems, it is a self-contradictory term. Election and competition are the two most important dimensions of democracy. Authoritarian regimes by (Juan’s) definition are undemocratic regimes. Electoral (competitive or democratic) and authoritarian (undemocratic) are incompatible and contradictory terms, additives that describe completely different and opposite types of regimes; they cannot be put together. Electoral (competitive) authoritarian regime blurs the boundary or distinction between democratic and authoritarian regimes.

Democracy has its minimal or basic criteria: public officials with decision-making power must be elected by the electorate, the formation of political parties must be legalized and competition between them must be free and fair. Democratic institutional arrangements guarantee free and fair elections and inter-party competition and with every national election (presidential or parliamentary depending on the constitutional system) there is a potential probability that rotation of power may take place. If elections held and competition allowed by an authoritarian regime are not free and fair and rotation of power is institutionally ruled out, then it is not democratic, just calling it an authoritarian or one-party authoritarian regime is enough. We do not have to add an adjective electoral (or competitive) to the authoritarian regime. The term, electoral (or competitive) authoritarianism, only confuses and makes us wonder
whether this type of regime is democratic or undemocratic.

Since 1950, the R.O.C. government has held local elections in Taiwan, but national elections were frozen for two decades (during the 1950s and 1960s). Beginning in 1972 supplementary elections were held for central (national) level representatives, but not for all the seats in the Legislative Yuan and an opposition political group called “Dangwai” (outside-the-party) was formed. Although the formation and operation of Dangwai was tolerated, its existence was illegal. With only partial national elections, rotation of power was institutionally excluded. Dangwai was an opposition force, but not a real (legal) opposition party. Thus, before the 1990s, the political regime in Taiwan can only be called a one–party authoritarian regime, and not an electoral (competitive) or hybrid regime. The lifting of martial law in 1987 began the process of democratic transition in Taiwan. In 1989, with the passage of the revised Civil Organization Act, the free formation of political parties was legalized. Since 1991, all seats in the Legislative Yuan have been subject to reelection at a regular interval (every three years), and since 1996 the President has been directly elected by all the citizens. Thus, the process of democratic transition was completed and the regime was transformed from a one-party authoritarian regime into a democratic regime. We need this kind of rigorous and clear cut classification and classificatory concepts of political regimes to analyze and explain the democratic transition in Taiwan. We do not have to give the political regime during the democratization process another typological term either. It is
It would divide the democratization process into two political transitions: first the authoritarian regime is transformed into an electoral authoritarian regime, second the electoral authoritarian regime is transformed into a democratic regime, rather than just one democratic transition (from authoritarian to democratic regime).

If we want to compare the degree of democracy of different democratic countries, we have to devise indexes of democracy and then measure them and give each country a score. In this case, democracy is a matter of more or less. But when we classify political regimes of different countries, democracy becomes a matter of either/or, not more or less. In classification, to abide by the criterion of exclusiveness, there must be a qualitative difference that separates democracy from authoritarianism. Authoritarian regimes are not less democratic than democratic regimes, but plainly undemocratic.

There are many research institutions which measure and rate the degree of democracy or freedom of different countries and publish their index annually, e.g., Reporters without Borders publishes the Press Freedom Index. Economic Intelligence Unit publishes the Index of Economic Freedom, and the Fraser Institute and Freedom House publish the Index of Freedom in the World. These indexes turn democracy from a classificatory concept into a comparative and quantitative concept. Democracy become a more-or-less concept, not an either/or concept. Some scholars in the EA literature use ratings and indexes published by Freedom House and some other scholars have
their own way of measuring the level of democracy. Freedom House assigns two numerical ratings—from 1 to 7—for political rights and civil liberties to each country, with 1 representing most free and 7 the least free. Then Freedom House adds two ratings into an index of freedom and classify various countries into three categories: free (meaning democratic) from 1-5, partly free (semi-democratic) from 6-10, and not free (undemocratic) from 11-14 (recently countries with index of freedom from 13-14 are put into a fourth category called worst of the worst) (Freedom House, 2015).

Freedom House is fine in devising its/an index of freedom (democracy), rating different countries and giving them scores, but its classification is very problematic. Freedom House classifies freedom (democracy) and different countries trichotomously into three types: free (democratic), partly free (semi-democratic) and not free (undemocratic). How can partly free (semi-democratic) and not free (undemocratic) be types (or subtypes) of freedom (democracy)? Democratic countries may have different degrees of freedom or democracy, but how can undemocratic (not free) countries have degrees of freedom or democracy? Perhaps an index of totalitarianism and an index of authoritarianism should be devised to measure and rate those undemocratic countries, if one insists on quantifying and comparing difference in degree. Freedom House’s classification may meet the criterion of inclusiveness, but it violates the criterion of exclusiveness, only one degree of democracy more or less separates one type from another.
Jørgen Møller and Svend-Erik Skaaning first divided political regimes into two types: democracy and autocracy and then they further divided democracy into four types: minimalist democracy, electoral democracy, polyarchy and liberal democracy. They further divided autocracy into two types: multiparty autocracy and closed autocracy. They use Freedom House scores to distinguish different types of democracy. They consider those scoring worse (more) than 2 on FH’s political rights index to be minimalist democracies and those earning civil-liberties scores worse (more) than 2 are considered electoral democracies; those scoring 2 are considered polyarchies; and those scoring 1 are considered liberal democracies. They consider countries with multiple parties in the national legislature (scoring 2) to be a multiparty autocracy, while considering those with only the ruling party represented in the legislature (scoring 1) or no legislature at all (scoring 0) to be closed autocracies (Møller and Skaaning, 2013). They also turn regime types into quantitative concepts and their multiparty autocracy type is very odd indeed. Monty G. Marshall’s Polity IV Project has also created an index for autocracy (Marshall, 2014). Barbara Geddes, Joseph Weight and Eric Frantz have also created a database for classifying authoritarian regimes (Geddes, Weight and Frantz, 2014). These indexes and database also turn regime types into comparative and quantitative concepts, regime types are given numbers and defined with “how much” quantitative scales, not with “what is” qualitative descriptions, one degree more or less separates one regime type from another.
Mainwaring, Brink and Pérez-Liñán employ a trichotomous classification: democratic, semi-democratic, and authoritarian regimes to classify nineteen political regimes in Latin America from 1945 to 1999 (Mainwaring, Brink and Pérez-Liñán, 2000). Although they stress that the first step in classifying political regimes is defining them, in their article they only define democracy without defining semi-democratic and authoritarian regimes. Their trichotomous classification is an ordinal scale in the sense of moving from more to less democratic. Their coding measures also blur the boundary between democracy and authoritarianism. Authoritarian regimes are plainly non-democratic, not less democratic. Although they criticize that dichotomous classification fails to capture intermediate regimes types, their semi-democratic regime type, like the term ‘electoral (competitive) regime’, obscures more than clarifies.

Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland compare three measures of the political regime: Democracy and Dictatorship (DD), Freedom House and Polity IV and choose the DD measure. They believe that existing measures of political regimes are significantly different and not interchangeable. They then extend the dichotomous DD measure into six-fold regime classification: parliamentary, semi-presidential and presidential democracy; and monarchic, military and civilian dictatorships (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010). This six-fold classification is most odd indeed. The first three types are classifications of constitutional systems, not political regimes and not one type is more or less democratic than another. The three
dictatorship types are ruled by different kinds of people; not one type is more or less authoritarian than another. On the contrary, Pemstein, Meserve and Melton think the available measures of democracy correlate highly with one another. They synthesize ten existing scales into a new measure called the United Democracy Scores (UDS). They then give every country in the world a democracy score and place them along a vertical scale from the most democratic down to the least democratic (Pemstein, Meserve and Melton, 2010). Pemstein, Meserve and Melton do not classify political regimes at all. Every country in the world is given a democracy score by them, thus, all regimes in the world are viewed by them as democratic regimes (Pemstein, Meserve and Melton, 2010).

VI. Conclusion

Classification is the main method for sorting out things and phenomena around us. When we classify political phenomena into classes and give each class a general noun we form classificatory concepts. To be useful in explaining political phenomena, a classificatory concept must have empirical import and systematic import. In addition, a good classification must also meet two more specific criteria: inclusiveness (or exhaustiveness) and exclusiveness. Every case shall fall into one class and one class only. A good classification and classificatory concept helps us understand. However, a bad classification and classificatory concept only confuses.
Modern political regimes can be classified into three main types: totalitarian, authoritarian, and democratic regimes. This classification meets better [with] the criterion of exclusiveness but not with the criterion of exhaustiveness. This classification classifies modern political regimes, but nowadays there are a few countries that still retain traditional forms of political regime. These traditional forms of the regime can not be put into any of these three classes.

“Modern democratic theorists,” like Schumpeter and Dahl, give democracy empirical and realistic definitions. The actual institutional arrangement for the elections of public officials and the fair competition between political parties are the two distinctive features of democracy. These two features are the basic, minimal or lowest criteria of democracy. We need these criteria for political research and analysis because they are clear-cut definitions. They clearly separate and distinguish democratic regimes from undemocratic regimes. Classical theories of democracy were normative and unrealistic; their definitions cannot serve as bases for empirical research.

Lijphart divides democratic regimes into two subtypes: majoritarian democracy and consensus democracy. He argues that the two different patterns of democracy have different policy performance. He finds that consensus democracies have the better record on effective government and policy-making and concludes that consensus democracies outperform majoritarian democracies. Most criticism of Lijphart’s theory centers on his assumed positive effects of consensus democracies on public policy. However, the most serious problems
with Lijphart’s two classificatory concepts reside squarely on the criteria of classification. He can find only New Zealand and England approaching a prototype of a majoritarian model and Switzerland and Belgium approaching a prototype of a consensus model. His typology fits better with parliamentary systems and excludes presidential systems. Many democratic countries cannot be put into either one of these two types, and some democratic countries can be put into both two types. In short, Lijphart’s two concepts violate both the two criteria of classification.

Both totalitarian and authoritarian regimes are undemocratic; they must be clearly defined and distinguished from each other. Authoritarian regimes can be divided into two distinct subtypes: military authoritarian regimes and one-party authoritarian regimes. One-party authoritarian regimes share one more characteristics with totalitarian regimes, both of them are ruled by a single party. Thus, there is more need to distinguish them. Linz’s definition is no help in this regard because he had only military authoritarian regimes in mind when he formed and defined ‘authoritarian regime’. Here we have to use Sartori’s classification of one-party systems to distinguish them.

In 1973, O’Donnell formed a new concept, ‘bureaucratic authoritarianism’ or ‘bureaucratic authoritarian regime’, to call the political systems that were implanted in Brazil in 1964 and in Argentina in 1966. In the 1950s and 1960s, most scholars, especially modernization theorists expected that industrialization and modernization would bring about democracy to the developing areas in
the Third World. O’Donnell put forth a new hypothesis that in the context of delayed development industrialization and modernization are more likely to lead to authoritarianism than democracy. O’Donnell’s concept of the BA regime shook the basic assumptions of modernization theory and stimulated considerable discussion and debate. Actually, the authoritarian regime established in Brazil in 1964 and in Argentina in 1966 (and most other BA cases) were established after military coups and rule by the military was established. Perhaps it is more appropriate just to call these regimes military authoritarian regimes.

Beginning in the mid-1970s, some scholars began to notice that many authoritarian regimes held some kind of election and allowed some form of competition. Levitsky and Way (2002) and Schedler (2002) and other scholars formed a new concept-the electoral (competitive) authoritarian regime-to refer to these mixed or hybrid regimes that combined some democratic rules with authoritarian governance. Schedler calculated that EA regimes make up more than two-thirds (69.9%) of all authoritarian regimes, it seems we do need to give these regimes a classificatory concept. However, the term EA regime has a conceptualization problem; it is a self contradictory term. The concept ‘EA regime’ blurs the boundary or distinction between democratic and authoritarian regimes. Election and competition are the two most important dimensions of democracy. Authoritarian regimes by definition are undemocratic regimes. If some democratic rules are used just to consolidate authoritarian rule and do not meet the basic
criteria of democracy, it may be better just to call them authoritarian regimes.

In short, modern political regimes can be classified into three main types: democratic, totalitarian, and authoritarian regimes. Democratic and totalitarian regimes do not need to be further classified into subtypes. Authoritarian regimes can be classified into two subtypes: military authoritarian and one-party authoritarian regimes. All other classificatory concepts of modern political regimes: majoritarian democracy and consensus democracy, bureaucratic authoritarianism and electoral (competitive) authoritarianism have their theoretical meanings and contributions, but examined with strict principles and criteria of concept formation and classification, most of them have conceptual or classificatory problems.
參考書目


Comparative Political Studies 24, 4: 512-531.


Skilling, H. Gor. 1971. “Group Conflict in Soviet Politics: Some

現代政權重要類型概念的
檢視與批判

吳文程※

分類是了解的開端，是我們分辨認識週遭事物的主要辦法。當我們將政治現象(活動、體系、制度)加以分類，每一類型給予一個一般性名詞，就形成了類型概念。本文試圖以基本的分類原則和標準來檢視(檢討和批判)比較政治裏，現代政權的一些重要的類型概念。現代政權可以分類成三個主要類型：民主的、極權的和權威的三種政權。為符合排斥性的標準，極權型政權和一黨權威型政權，必須清楚地加以區分。賴帕特(Arend Lijphart)將民主區分成多數民主和共識民主二種模式，使我們了解二種模式的不同政治效果，但是他的分類並不符合分類的標準。權威型政權可以進一步分類成二種類型：軍事權威型政權和一黨權威型政權。歐當諾(Guillermo O’Donnell)的官僚權威型政權概念，將研究焦點聚焦於官僚體系和技術官僚的角色，以及經濟的決定性因素。但是既然這些政權大多數是由軍隊和軍人所建立和統治，也許就稱它們為軍事權威型政權比較適當。選舉(競爭)權威型政權也許有不少經驗世界的個案，但它是一個自相矛盾的名詞，它混淆了民主和權威型(非民主)政權的界限。如果那些形式上的民主措施只是為了鞏固權威型政權，並不符合民主的最低標準，何不就稱它們為權威型政權。

※ 東吳大學政治學系教授